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Countries with a strong tradition of press freedom, and with networks of organizations dedicated to upholding its principles, tend to mount a more robust response to Chinese government influence efforts. In 10 of the countries under study, local press freedom groups and the broader journalistic community mobilized in solidarity to condemn incidents in which Chinese government officials or affiliated companies engaged in intimidating or coercive behavior. In Kenya, the Media Council, a self-regulatory body for news outlets, rebuked the public broadcaster for publishing unlabeled Chinese state propaganda.1 Taiwanese civil society has been instrumental in raising public awareness of CCP influence in local media, taking action in the form of mass demonstrations, legislative advocacy, journalist trainings, disinformation investigations, and media literacy programs.

Rather than acting to address such vulnerabilities and fortify democratic resilience, government officials in 19 of the 30 countries have increased their own attacks on independent media, journalists, and civil society since 2019. Media outlets operating in more politically hostile or physically dangerous environments have less capacity to expose and resist the influence tactics deployed by the CCP and its proxies, especially if local political elites favor close ties with Beijing. In Ghana, Malaysia, Mozambique, Senegal, and Kuwait, local officials used their own political clout or restrictive regulations to suppress critical reporting or override independent oversight related to China.

In Argentina, Mexico, Nigeria, and South Africa, especially prolific diplomats published 30, 40, or even over 50 articles in local outlets, for an average of more than one a month. In most cases, the articles were not limited to a single outlet but rather were published across a wide variety of platforms. In some cases they were tied to specific content-sharing agreements. In 2021, the Chinese embassy in Kuwait became the sole provider of content for a special bimonthly column in a daily newspaper.1 Such articles, while clearly labeled as coming from Chinese government representatives, allow them to speak to local audiences without the mediation of a critical journalist or interviewer. Although outlets occasionally published additional op-eds in which local or international commentators could respond to or challenge a Chinese ambassador, this was a relatively rare occurrence.

Congress has been concerned about whether U.S. firms, in activities connected with exportingsatellites, provided expertise to China for use in its ballistic missile and space programs and whetherU.S. policy has facilitated transfers of military-related technology to China. This CRS Reportdiscusses security concerns, policy changes, congressional action, and a chronology of majordevelopments since 1988 under President Reagan. It is updated as warranted.Some critics opposed satellite exports to China, while others were concerned that the ClintonAdministration relaxed export controls and monitoring of commercial satellites in moving thelicensing authority from the State Department to the Commerce Department in 1996. A range ofconcerns were prompted by New York Times reports in April 1998 that the JusticeDepartment begana criminal investigation into whether Loral Space and Communications Ltd. and Hughes ElectronicsCorp. violated export control laws. The firms allegedly shared their findings with China on the causeof a rocket's explosion while launching a U.S.-origin satellite in February 1996. The companiesreportedly provided expertise that China could use to improve the accuracy and reliability of itsfuture ballistic missiles, including their guidance systems. At least three classified studies reportedlyfound that U.S. national security was harmed. Congress and the Executive Branch also investigatedHughes' review of China's launch failure of January 1995. After failed satellite launches in 1992,1995, and 1996, China has reported 28 consecutive, successful commercial and government/militaryspace launches. In 2000, the State Department and Lockheed Martin agreed to a settlement with afine of $13 million. In 2002, Loral announced a civil settlement with a fine of $20 million. In early2003, Hughes and Boeing agreed to a civil penalty of $32 million.In 1998, Congress passed the FY1999 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 105-261 ) thattransferred licensing authority over satellites back to the State Department (effective March 15,1999). On December 30, 1998, the Cox Committee unanimously approved a classified report saidto conclude that China's technology acquisitions over the past 20 years, not only that associated withsatellite launches, harmed U.S. national security. The Senate Intelligence Committee released itsunclassified report on May 7, and the Cox Committee issued a declassified report on May 25, 1999(see CRS Report RL30220(pdf) ). Congress has debated whether to shift satellite export controls back toCommerce. Congress also oversees the Bush Administration's actions, including any newPresidential waivers of post-Tiananmen sanctions (after the last waiver in 1998 for Loral'sChinasat-8); export licenses; reviews of policy toward China on satellite exports or spacecooperation; and weapons proliferation sanctions that have banned satellite exports to China sinceSeptember 2001, with new sanctions imposed on September 19, 2003 (see CRS Report RL31555 ).China has had no commercial satellite launches since 2000. Legislation for State Departmentappropriations for FY2004 ( H.R. 2799 and S. 1585 ) wouldcontinue to require State to notify theCommittees on Appropriations at least 15 days in advance of obligating or expending funds forprocessing licenses to export U.S.-origin satellites to China.

Some critics opposed satellite exports to China, while others were concerned that the Clinton Administration relaxed export controls and monitoring of commercial satellites in moving thelicensing authority from the State Department to the Commerce Department in 1996. A range ofconcerns were prompted by New York Times reports in April 1998 that the Justice Department begana criminal investigation into whether Loral Space and Communications Ltd. and Hughes ElectronicsCorp. violated export control laws. The firms allegedly shared their findings with China on the causeof a rocket's explosion while launching a U.S.-origin satellite in February 1996. The companiesreportedly provided expertise that China could use to improve the accuracy and reliability of itsfuture ballistic missiles, including their guidance systems. At least three classified studies reportedlyfound that U.S. national security was harmed. Congress and the Executive Branch also investigatedHughes' review of China's launch failure of January 1995. After failed satellite launches in 1992,1995, and 1996, China has reported 28 consecutive, successful commercial and government/militaryspace launches. In 2000, the State Department and Lockheed Martin agreed to a settlement with afine of $13 million. In 2002, Loral announced a civil settlement with a fine of $20 million. In early2003, Hughes and Boeing agreed to a civil penalty of $32 million.

China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC, or China Great Wall) has been China's commercial space launch company since 1986. It has marketed the use of rockets developed by theChina Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) and other aerospace academies. ChinaGreat Wall and CALT have been part of China's defense-related aerospace industry under the ChinaAerospace Corporation (abbreviated by China as CASC). CASC, established in 1993, has overseenspace as well as missile research and development. CASC and its subordinate companies, researchacademies, and factories have developed and produced strategic and tactical ballistic missiles, spacelaunch vehicles, surface-to-air missiles, cruise missiles, and military (e.g., reconnaissance andcommunications satellites) and civilian satellites. CASC was previously known as the Ministry ofAerospace Industry, also called the Seventh Ministry of Machine Building. The PLA has exercisedcontrol over satellite launches (under the new General Equipment Department since April 1998).

Moreover, the committee held meetings in hotel rooms in China which were probably not securefrom listening devices planted by China's intelligence service, conducted unmonitored technicalinterviews with over 100 PRC engineers and technical personnel, and generated over 200 pages ofdata and analyses.

However, at least three classified studies found serious concerns about the U.S. firms' assistance to China's ballistic missile modernization program. A classified report at the Departmentof Defense's Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) reportedly concluded on May16, 1997, that Loral and Hughes transferred expertise to China that significantly enhanced theguidance and control systems of its nuclear ballistic missiles and that "United States national securityhas been harmed." (14) Significantly, the U.S. firmswere suspected of helping China to improvequality control and diagnostic techniques that would enable its aerospace engineers to detectproblems in guidance systems applicable to missiles. These concerns were first raised in a classifiedreport at the Air Force's National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) in March 1997 and supported bythe State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau (INR).(15) Also, analysis by CIA at the timedid not find "proliferation concerns." These reports apparently prompted the Justice Department'scriminal investigation that began in September 1997.

Beyond the Loral Case. Beyond the 1996 incident involving Loral and Hughes, there were wider concerns that the policy of allowing China to launchU.S.-built satellites has effectively subsidized and assisted China's missile modernization. Observers pointed out that the same PRC companies and engineers work in both civilian and militaryprograms and that much of the technology used in launching satellites can be used in militaryprograms on missiles, satellites, and other areas. 2b1af7f3a8